In this paper, we consider an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) assisted communications system, including two cooperative UAVs, a wireless-powered ground destination node leveraging simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) technique, and a terrestrial passive eavesdropper. One UAV delivers confidential information to destination and the other sends jamming signals to against eavesdropping and assist destination with energy harvesting. Assuming UAVs have partial information about eavesdropper's location, we propose two transmission schemes: friendly UAV jamming (FUJ) and
I INTRODUCTION R ECENTLY, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) has been deemed as a promising wireless service provider alongside with plethora of other civilian applications (see [1] [2] [3] [4] and references therein). This is driven by advances in wireless equipment miniaturization as well as the economic ease of deployment and flexibility of UAVs inasmuch as various Tech giants (e.g. Facebook and Google) [5] have been focusing on establishing massive UAV-assisted networks for ubiquitous connectivity. As a matter of fact, the upsurge of UAV applications in wireless communications is double-edged sword; in that bringing new opportunities and facilitating novel technologies, while accompanying with undeniable critical challenges when employed in the real world.
On the one hand, with an increasing demand of Internet-of-things (IoT) applications, UAVs can be regarded as a good candidate to serve as aerial base stations and even power beacons for prolonging energy-constraint IoT devices [6] [7] [8] [9] . In such applications, a challenging issue is that how to prolong device lifetime due to limited access to power resources and/or infrequent battery replacements [6] . To tackle it, apart from conventional energy harvesting techniques, simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) has recently emerged [10] . To be specific, SWIPT captures both data and energy from the same radio frequency (RF) signal and converts into direct current for battery recharging, which enables energy harvesting in a controllable manner. This characteristic is particularly important for UAV applications [9] , to guarantee replenishable-energy ground nodes considering their dynamic adjustment capability [7] .
On the other hand, safeguarding such wireless communications system is of the most paramount challenges due to the broadcast nature of transmission and mobility of UAVs. To guarantee security of UAV communications, physical-layer (PHY) security techniques [1] , [11] , [12] have, providentially, been ascertained as a promising and computationally-efficient information secrecy approach. Among various PHY-security techniques, cooperative jamming is one viable anti-eavesdropping strategy via collaboratively transmitting jamming signals to degrade wiretap channel quality. In [13] , the authors have considered a mobile UAV serving as a flying base station delivering data to a ground node in the presence of a passive eavesdropper. In [14] , leveraging the mobility of a UAV, the authors have studied the achievable secrecy rate via trajectory design and power control optimization, and showed its improvement over conventional static jammers. This is due to the fact that the mobility of UAV-jammer allows an opportunistically jamming at a closer distance to the eavesdropper. In [15] , the authors have tackled maximizing the minimum secrecy rate of jammer-incorporated UAV communications via a joint optimization of trajectory and transmit power of UAVs. In [16] , the authors have studied the problem when a UAV is employed as friendly jammer to assist secure communication in the presence of unknown eavesdropper location, and they have examined the UAV-jammer displacement and power control to guarantee good reliability and security.
Motivated by above research, in this paper, we consider two flying cooperative UAVs as well as a ground destination node equipped with wireless RF energy harvester, in the presence of a passive ground eavesdropper. One UAV acts as source transmitting confidential information to destination while the other UAV broadcasts jamming signals to assist anti-eavesdropping and energy harvesting of the destination node. Note that, different from [13] , [17] , [18] , we here consider a SWIPT-enabled receiver at destination for security and energy scavenging. Also, different from [18] , [19] wherein UAVs know the exact location of eavesdropper, we here assume that UAVs have only partial information of eavesdropper's location. Following our setting, we make the following contributions in the paper.
• We propose two cooperative UAV-jamming PHY-security schemes: friendly UAV jamming (FUJ) and Gaussian jamming transmission (GJT). In particular, in FUJ, UAV transmits jamming signals that are known a priori at destination, while in GJT, destination node has no prior information of the jamming signals from UAV.
• Via trajectory discretization approach, we formulate an average secrecy rate (ASR) maximization problem, which is challenging to solve due to non-smooth and non-concave objective function and non-convex feasible set.
• To make the optimization problem tractable, we propose an efficient iterative algorithm based on block coordinate descent (BCD) and successive convex approximation (SCA) methods in order to find a unique suboptimal solution to the problem with guaranteed convergence.
• Via the proposed iterative algorithm, we conduct optimization of the following sub-problems: transmit power of UAVs, power splitting ratio in SWIPT, as well as UAVs trajectory.
• We compare by simulations secrecy and energy harvesting performance, transmit power of UAVs of our proposed schemes under various scenarios, demonstrating its significant performance improvement over conventional without-jamming (WoJ) scheme, wherein there exists no UAV-jammer. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces system model. Section III presents two 2-UAV transmission schemes via cooperative UAV jamming. In Section IV, we formulate ASR optimization problem via trajectory discretization approach and provide solutions in Section V. Simulation results are given in Section VI, followed by conclusions in Section VII.
II SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a UAV-enabled wireless communications system (see Fig. 1 ), where a UAV-source (S) flies from initial to final locations to deliver confidential information to a legitimate ground destination (D) in the presence of a ground eavesdropper (E) with unknown location. Here, we consider D to be an energy-limited IoT device that is capable of harvesting energy from ambient radio resources and its receiver adopts power splitting architecture for simultaneous energy scavenging and data decoding with a power splitting ratio (PSR) ζ (0 ≤ ζ ≤ 1) [6] , [20] .
Finally, a UAV-jammer (J ) is employed to transmit noise-like jamming signals cooperatively to improve security and power the energy-constraint D.
We consider that all nodes have single omnidirectional antenna that operate in half-duplex mode. We define main link (S-D), wiretap link (S-E), jamming link (J -D, J -E), as shown in 
II-A System Parameters
Without loss of generality, we assume that all the nodes are located in a three-dimensional Cartesian coordinate system with the following parameters:
• D has the horizontal coordinate W D ∈ R 2×1 with zero altitude,
• S and J 's initial and final locations are Q SI ∈ R 2×1 , Q JI ∈ R 2×1 , Q SF ∈ R 2×1 , and Q JF ∈ R 2×1 , with constant flying altitude H (e.g. [17] , [21] ),
• S and J have the same mission time T , and their horizontal location at
• S and J have a safety distanceD to avoid collision 1 ,
• S and J have total transmission power P tot S and jamming power P tot J , respectively, whereas at t ∈ [0, T ], their associate instantaneous powers are P S (t) and P J (t),
• PSR, denoted by ζ ∈ (0, 1), is the fraction of received power for information processing, while (1-ζ) is the fraction of which to be harvested and stored for future use. The instantaneous PSR is, therefore, denoted by ζ(t).
Further, we have the following assumptions on D and E's locations:
• D's location is known to both UAVs (e.g. [22] , [13] ),
• E's location (W E ∈ R 2×1 ) is unknown, but both UAVs can approximately estimate it [23] in a collaborative manner. As such, we assume that E's circular estimated region centered atŴ E ∈ R 2×1 (namely most-likely location of E) with radius R E ≥ W E −Ŵ E (namely maximum estimation error) are known to the UAVs, where · represents the L2-norm (Euclidean norm).
II-B Channel Model
Motivated by literature (see [19] , [24] , [21] , [25] , [26] , [27] ), in this work, we adopt a probabilistic line-of-sight (LOS) channel model that models both LoS and Non-LoS propagations by taking into account their occurrence probabilities [24] . Averaging over surrounding environment and small-scale fading, the expected channel power of UAV-ground (UG) links at time instant t is [24] ĥ
with the regularized attenuation factor given bŷ
where d ag (t) = Q a (t) − W g 2 + H 2 represents the time varying distance between the aerial node a and the ground node g. Moreover, θ ag (t) = tan −1 H dag(t) denotes the time-varing elevation-angle between those two, wherein a ∈{S, J } and g ∈{D, E}, α denotes the path-loss exponent (2 ≤ α ≤ 4) [28] , β 0 is the path loss at reference distance d 0 meter for omnidirectional antennas under LoS, i.e.,
where C = 3 × 10 8 m/s is the speed of light and f c is the carrier frequency [28] . The parameter κ is the additional attenuation factor characterizing Non-LoS propagation (in practice it is a random variable with log-normal distribution denoting the shadowing effect); however, in (2), this parameter is regarded to be constant following homogeneous assumption for Non-LoS environment. Further, we assume that the probability of having LoS environment is modelled as a function of the elevation angle θ(t)
with environmental constants k 1 , k 2 > 0. In consistency with [24] , we assumê
for the sake of simplicity of trajectory and resource allocation design. 2 
III PROPOSED PHY-SECURITY SCHEMES AND INSTANTANEOUS/AVERAGE SECRECY

CAPACITY
In this work, we present two PHY-security schemes involving two UAVs. Major difference between our schemes and other known two-UAV schemes (e.g. [15] , [18] , [19] ) lies in that the additional cooperative UAV conducts not only jamming transmission but also powering D in a more practical channel modelling:
• A FUJ scheme, wherein FUJ transmits jamming signals that are known a priori at D 2 It is worth pointing out that this approximated and simplified model is too fruitful in some applications such as post-disaster area wherein it is non-trivial to categorise the environment based on which the probabilistic model has been developed. However, the minimum and maximum values of path-loss component α can be used for upper and lower bound performance [2] .
• A GJT scheme, wherein D has no prior knowledge 3 of the noise-like jamming signal.
To evaluate performance of above schemes (particularly in later simulations), we consider a benchmark scheme:
• No additional UAV-jammer (WoJ) scheme with SWIPT at destination. Note that this setup is similar to [13] , except [13] has no SWIPT.
III-A Instantaneous Secrecy Rate (ISR)
Recall system parameters in subsection II-A and assume normalized bandwidth in all links.
GJT has the achievable average rate over the random channel realizations at time instant t as
where γ S (t)
with N 0 being the noise power at the receiver of D.
Since the UAV jamming signal is known a priori by D as well as the channel state information (CSI) is available, it can be removed from the received signals. Therefore, FUJ has the achievable instantaneous ensumble rate from S to D as
Additionally, for both GJT and FUJ, the exact instantaneous wiretap channel capacityÎ E (t)
at eavesdropper can be obtained aŝ
where the AWGN noise power at E is considered identical to that at D for the simplicity of exposition. 3 Note that while the FUJ scheme requires a priori to generate jamming signals at J and also costs a higher computational complexity at D to operate jamming cancellation, it can be implemented via various approaches such as key-assisted coding;
i.e., an intelligent combination of conventional cryptography with PHY-security [29] . Specially, when the location of the eavesdropper E is unknown to the legitimate nodes and the wiretap link quality might experience a better channel condition compared to the main link, the former scheme is capable of PHY-security enhancement, while the latter lacks such an undeniable performance advantage nonetheless provides a low complex implementation approach.
The maximum achievable data rate by E within the uncertainty region R E , which serves as an upper-bound for the case of exact location of E, can be calculated as
Proof. Please see Appendix A.
III-B Average Secrecy Capacity
The achievable ASR from S to D with normalized transmission bandwidth is defined in bits/s/Hz as [30] 
where [x] + = max{x, 0} and I M (t) for GJT and FUJ schemes are given in (4) and (5),
for WoJ is identical to (8) but with setting γ J (t) = 0.
IV PROBLEM FORMULATION FOR MAXIMIZING ASR
To maximize (9), we need a joint design of UAV trajectory, transmission power allocations, and power splitting ratio. To make our design practically feasible, we consider the trajectory discretization approach dividing the mission time T into N equally-spaced time slots
Given δ t , assuming distance variation between any UAV and the ground terminals is adequately small, we adopt constant average channel gains per slot. Other system design parameters and definitions are quantized accordingly and being constant within each time slot. Hence,
withR sec [n] given by (11) (shown on top of the next page)
where (C1,C3) and (C2,C4) are constraints of average and maximum transmission/jamming powers per time slot at S and J , i.e., (P S ,P J ) and (P S ,P J ), respectively, wherē
Additionally, these fixed powers are chosen subject to the peak to average power ratio (PAPR) constraint, i.e.,P K P K is restricted due to hardware limitations, where K ∈ {S, J}, and maximum network transmission power per time slot aŝ
To ensure a sufficient discretization as well as valid assumptions of invariant channel condition and unchanged distance between any UAV and ground nodes, we have mobility constraints as
and
are constant speeds of S and J in time slot n, but the velocities may vary from one slot to next. In particular, the maximum horizontal displacement of S and J per slot is bounded by threshold maximum distanced δ ≪ H. For the considered two-UAV system, collision avoidance is represented by
whereD is the safety distance between the two UAVs. Then, the permitted flying zone for UAVs is assumed to be a circular region with radiusR, i.e.,
whereR
must be satisfied to avoid power outage and guarantee the viability of energy harvesting. In (18), Ψ H is the minimum required input power for energy harvesting, andP R is given in (13) . Finally, energy harvesting constraints are
with harvested power in time slot n given by (20) 
The facts that, (P 1) is non-convex and the optimization parameters are tightly coupled due to C15, make the problem intractable and motivates us to propose an alternating optimization approach: an efficient iterative algorithm based on block coordinate descent (BCD) and successive convex approximation (SCA) methods, where at each iteration a single block of variables is optimized by convex optimization approach, while the remaining variables remain unchanged.
By doing so, the convergence of the proposed approach to at least a sub-optimal solution is guaranteed under a feasible set [31] . The remaining analysis are given as follows.
V-A Optimal Transmit Power of UAV-source
In the following, we optimize the power allocation of S for GJT, FUJ, and WoJ, under the given feasible trajectories and PSRs. Thus, the sub-problem for optimal transmission of S for the most general case (GJT) can be obtained by reformulating (P 1) equivalently as
where log(·) represents natural logarithm, the auxiliary constants {A n } N n=1 , {B n } N n=1 , {C n } N n=1 , and {D n } N n=1 , are given by
where R E is defined in (7) . The sub-problem (P 2) is still non-convex with respect to P S due to non-convex objective function.
Since one can readily verify that problem (P 2) satisfies the SlaterâȂŹs condition, strong duality attains which enables us to obtain the optimal solution by solving the corresponding Lagrange dual problem using Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. As such, by temporarily dropping C2 and C15, and lettingP S and (P S , λ) be any primal and dual optimal points with zero duality gap, the Lagrangian function can be computed as
where λ is the Lagrange factor. Then, maximizing the Lagrangian dual function defined as
one can reach the optimality condition as [30] A 
whereP
wherein the non-negative Lagrange factor λ can be obtained by applying a simple bisection search such that the UAV source power budget constraint; i.e.,
is satisfied.
We note that, for FUJ, the optimal S power allocation P ⋆ S , following the similar approach to GJT, can be obtained as (29) by removing the term ζ
denominator of (23). Likewise, the optimal S power allocation for the WoJ is given by (29) by letting P J [n] equals to zero in (23), (24) , and (26).
V-B Optimal Transmit Power of UAV-jammer
Under keeping other variables unchanged, we aim at optimizing the jamming transmit power for GJT and FUJ. As such, the sub-problem for optimization of the transmit power of J for GJT can be obtained by rewriting (P 1) as
where the auxiliary constants
The sub-problem (P 3) is still non-convex 4 with respect to P J due to non-convex objective function being in the form of convex-minus-convex based on Lemma 1 given below.
Lemma 1. Let x ∈ R N ×1 be a vector of variables, {a n } N n=1 and {b n } N n=1 be all non-negative constants. Then, the vector function defined as
is convex.
Proof. By calculating the gradient and obtaining the Hessian matrix of f (x) we have
The convexity of f (x) follows from the fact that the Hessian matrix given by (40) is positive semi-definite. Since it is in a diagonal form with all non-negative elements, all the eigenvalues corresponding to the Hessian matrix are non-negative. This completes the proof.
Since the first term of the objective function to be maximized is convex, our approach is twofold: approximating this convex term with its corresponding concave lower bound, and applying SCA in an iterative manner to reach a guaranteed converging solution. Specifically, we replace the first convex term (P 3) with its first order Taylor expansion at {P k J [n]} N n=1 , which is defined as the given transmit power of J at iteration k. It is worth mentioning that based on first-order condition [32] , the first order Taylor approximation at the local point x 0 ∈ R N ×1 provides a global under-estimator of a convex function f (x), i.e.,
where (·) † represents transpose operator. Thus, for any given local point at iteration k; i.e., P k J = {p k J [n]} N n=1 , (P 3) turns into an approximated convex problem as
whereÂ
Note that (P 4) is a convex problem for which the Slater's conditions can be readily verified, any points P ⋆ J and (P ⋆ J , λ ⋆ ) satisfying the KKT conditions are primal and dual optimal with zero duality gap, which implies that the dual optimum is attained. Although problem (P 4) can be numerically solved by any standard convex optimization techniques such as the interior-point method [32] , we prefer to apply Lagrangian method to gain further insight into structure of the optimal solution. As such, dropping temporarily constraintC4, the Lagrange dual function is written as
Then, by solving ∇g (P J , λ) = 0, with constraintC4, the semi-analytical optimal solution structure of P ⋆ J , by applying KKT conditions, is obtained as
where λ ⋆ ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier at optimal point, satisfying N n=1 P ⋆ J [n] ≤ P tot J , which can be attained by a simple bisection search. Finally, we note that (P 4) is a lower-bound to (P 3) but with the same constraints, the solution to (P 4), i.e., P ⋆ J , is no less than that of (P 3) at the given point B n ,Â n , P k J . Similarly, for the FUJ scheme the optimal J power allocation P ⋆ J , can be obtained by solving the convex optimization problem (P 5) : maximize
At the optimal solution, constraint C3 must hold with equality, namelyC3 equality constraint, otherwise, one can increase the value of objective function by increasing P J [n] without violating the constraints. Then, having made implicit the box constraintsC4, the dual function for (P 5)
is written as
where the non-negative scalar ν is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding toC3 in (P 5). Now, applying the KKT conditions for (47) yields optimality condition
where {P ⋆ J [n]} N n=1 , ν ⋆ are the optimal points. Finally, solving equation above while considering constraintC4; we reach the optimal solution of P
where ν ⋆ can be obtained by a simple bisection search satisfying N n=1 P ⋆ J [n] = P tot J .
V-C Optimal power splitting ratio
We aim at designing an efficient power splitter at destination D. For fixed P K and Q K , where K ∈{S, J }, the equivalent sub-problem for optimizing PSR {ζ[n]} N n=1 of both GJT and FUJ, is recasted as
where the auxiliary constants for n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} are defined as
It can be verified from Lemma 2 that the problem (P 6) is concave and its objective function is monotonically increasing. (bx+1) 2 (ax+bx+1) 2 respectively, where D is the differentiation operator. Since for any value of x in the domain of f we have Df (x) > 0 and D 2 f (x) < 0, this illustrates that the function is strictly concave being monotonic increasing. Besides, we know that the log-product function or equivalently h = log(x) where x = {x i } N i=1 is concave and non-increasing with respect to each argument x i . Therefore, from the vector composition law [32] one can readily conclude that g(
Therefore, the analytical solution for ζ ⋆ for GJT scenario can be readily obtained as
For FUJ and WoJ, replacing the constants B n = 0 and (52) and (53), respectively, one can apply similar approach in (54) to obtain the optimal solution ζ ζ ζ ⋆ .
V-D Optimal source trajectory design
We aim at optimizing the approximated path of S offline for the three schemes in terms of ASR. The corresponding sub-problem of S-trajectory design for GJT is reformulated as
where
Since (P 7) is non-concave and constraints C11 andC15 are not convex, the optimization problem is non-convex and hard to solve. To simplify it, we reformulate 
Note that C16 must hold with equality at the optimal point, otherwise by decreasing T [n] one can increase the value of objective function without violating any constraints, similarly for C17.
Then (P 7) and (P 8) are equivalent and have the same optimal points. Next, based on Lemma 3, we observe that the objective function of (P 8) is in the form of convex-minus-convex. 
,
where f (x) is convex as D 2 f ≥ 0. Note that we implicitly take the extended-value extension of f (x), i.e., f (x), which is defined ∞ outside the domain of f (x) for the latter result. Thus, the summation of convex functions results in a convex function. This completes the proof.
Lemma 4. Let x be a vector of variables {x i } N i=1 and a ∈ R N ×1 be a constant vector . The function of negative norm-squared of this two vectors; f (x) = − x − a 2 , which obviously is a concave function with respect to the vector x, has a convex upper-bound given by
Proof. See appendix B.
Using Lemmas 3 and 4, we reformulate (P 8) in an approximated convex form by having concave objective function with convex feasible set as
Note thatC11 andC17 follow from Lemma 4. Additionally, using C16 implies that T is nonnegative such that T [n] ≥ H. Therefore, for H ≥ 1,C15 is regarded as a convex constraint and (P 9) can be optimally solved by any known solvers, here, we use CVX [33] . Further, for FUJ, the corresponding sub-problem of S-trajectory design is similar to (P 7) by replacing (57) with
, and then obtain solution in a similar manner as above.
Finally, for the conventional case WoJ, the sub-problem of S path planning with SWIPT at destination and partially known E location is reformulated as
which is non-convex because of Lemma 3 or non-convex constraint C15, and therefore we obtain a convex approximated problem of (P 10) as
Now (P 11) is convex. With an initial point Q k S , T k , U k , we can solve it optimally with CVX.
V-E Optimal jammer trajectory design
We aim at designing an optimal trajectory of J , provided that (P S , P J , ζ ζ ζ, Q S ) are given. For GJT, we formulate the sub-problem of J -trajectory design as
where for ∀n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, we have 
Since matrix H is positive semidefinite for t > 0, the function f (x, y) is convex. Therefore, its first Taylor expansion providing a global under-estimator of f (x, y) at point (x 0 , y 0 ) is given by
Based on Lemma 5, the objective function of (P 13) is in the form of convex-minus-convex with respect toṼ [n] = α 2 log V [n] andS[n] = α 2 log S[n], i.e., it is still non-convex. Hence, the approximated convex problem corresponding to (P 13) can be obtained as
where H 1 = − Q k J [n] 2 + Ŵ D 2 + H 2 and also the concave lower-bound function f LB is given by
, and J n = 2 α exp 2 αṼ k [n] . Note that constraints C11,C16, andC18 are obtained by substituting the non-convex terms into their corresponding expressions using Lemma 4. Since (P 14) is now convex, we use CVX and [34] to solve it, given an initial point (Q k J , S k , V k ), where the superscript K denotes iteration index. Further, to optimize J -trajectory for FUJ, we solve (P 13) by removing the terms involving S[n] from its objective function.
VI NUMERICAL RESULTS
In simulations, unless otherwise stated, we adopt the following parameters. . In particular, in optimal trajectory comparisons, we adopt the so-called baseline scheme for UAVs initial trajectory; i.e., both S and J fly with their maximum speeds towards as close as D and the geometric center of estimated location of E, respectively. Then, both UAVs hover above the corresponding points as long as possible in order to send the data and conduct jamming transmission, respectively, followed by heading with their maximum speeds towards final location, provided that the mission time is sufficient. Otherwise, they turn from a midway heading towards the final locations. Fig. 2 illustrates the convergence of the proposed iterative algorithms for FUJ, GJT, and WoJ. We plot absolute error function f err (k) as the number of iteration k varies (complexity is O(kN m ), where m is the number of variable blocks). We see all schemes converge with terminating threshold ǫ = 10 −2 , validating our analysis in terms of convexity of the approximated sub-problems. Fig. 3 illustrates the optimal UAVs' trajectory for FUJ, GJT, and WoJ using the proposed sequential algorithm. Note the green-edge and black-edge circles denote the exact location of D and E, respectively. We observe that, for FUJ scheme, S gets the closest to D among all, with substantially improved ASR. For FUJ, the operation time and energy constraints can make J head directly to the best possible position for jamming, which is much shorter than GJT. aforementioned baseline scheme, and demonstrates our method leads to a significant performance improvement. We also observe that FUJ brings always positive secrecy rate; nonetheless, WoJ provides zero ISR at the beginning and end of the mission. avoid degradation of ASR. Finally, WoJ keeps its power resource for the best use when having a better main channel quality with keeping S trajectory to be as far as possible from the estimated location of E. Fig. 8 illustrates harvested power efficiency for FUJ, GJT, and WoJ, with respective fraction of total power budget P S [n] + P J [n] as 100%, 58.06% and 99.7%, respectively. We see that, for all cases, energy harvesting constraint is satisfied and the harvested power is well above the minimum requirement Ψ H , particularly WoJ. This indicates that how we can design secure as well as energy efficient UAV-based communications protocols which is a good direction for our future work.
VII CONCLUSION
We have considered a 2-UAV based wireless communication system. It consists of two flying cooperative UAVs, a ground destination node equipped with SWIPT technique, and a passive ground eavesdropper. One UAV acts as source transmitting confidential information to destination, while the other UAV propagates jamming to assist destination with anti-eavesdropping and energy harvesting. Assuming that UAVs have imperfect channel estimation eavesdropper, we have proposed two transmission schemes: FUJ and GJT, transmitting jamming signals that are a Following from Lemma 6 we conclude that the expression given by (6) is a monotonically decreasing function with respect to the term Q S (t) − W E and a monotonically increasing function with respect to the term Q J (t) − W E . Then, from linear algebra and applying the regular and the reverse triangular inequality, one can obtain as
Then, plugging the lower and upper deterministic expressions respectively given in (A.3) and (A.4) into the objective function of (7) , leads to the final expression of I max E (t) as given in (8).
APPENDIX B
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF LEMMA 4
We commence from the concavity of the function f (x) = − x − a 2 with the gradient equal to ∇f (x) = −2(x − a) as
where (a) follows after the fact that the first order Taylor approximation of a concave function is a global affine over-estimator of the function f (x) at the point x 0 .
